Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2001

The State of Utah v. Wintron Nunez : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Mark L. Shurtleff; Attorney General; Attorney for Appellee.
Joan C. Watt; Deborah Kreek Mendez; Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc.; Attorneys for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, The State of Utah v. Wintron Nunez, No. 20010019 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2001).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/3078

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

CaseNo.20010019-CA

WINTRON NUNEZ,

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal from a judgment of conviction for unlawful distribution, offering,
agreeing, consenting or arranging to distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, a
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii) (Supp. 2000),
in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the
Honorable Roger A. Livingston, Judge, presiding.
JOAN C. WATT (3967)
DEBORAH KREECK MENDEZ (5743)
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellant
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666)
ATTORNEY GENERAL
Heber M. Wells Building
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P. O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
Attorney for Appellee

fc|

U JLafa J&SS4J

«&*&

Utah Court of Appeals

MAY 1 5 2001
Paulette Stagg
Clerk of the Court

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

WINTRON NUNEZ,

:

Case No. 20010019-CA

:

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal from a judgment of conviction for unlawful distribution, offering,
agreeing, consenting or arranging to distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, a
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii) (Supp. 2000),
in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the
Honorable Roger A. Livingston, Judge, presiding.
JOAN C. WATT (3967)
DEBORAH KREECK MENDEZ (5743)
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellant

MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666)
ATTORNEY GENERAL
HeberM. Wells Building
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P. O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
Attorney for Appellee

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES
State v. Baker. 671 P.2d 152 (Utah 1983)

7, 8, 9, 12

State v. Carruth. 1999 UT 107, 993 P.2d 869

7

State v. Crick. 675 P.2d 527 (Utah 1983)

11

State v.Oldrovd. 685 P.2d 551 (Utah 1984)

8, 10, 11, 12

State v. Simpson. 904 P.2d 709 (Utah App. 1995)

1

STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (Supp. 2000)

2, 9

Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(4) (1953 as amended)

8

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996)

1

ii

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff7Appellee,

:

v.

:

WINTRON NUNEZ,

:

Case No. 20010019-CA

:

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996).
The Honorable Roger A. Livingston, Judge, Third District Court, Salt Lake County, State
of Utah, entered judgment of conviction for unlawful distribution of a controlled
substance in a public park, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii) (Supp. 2000). R. 123. A copy of the judgment is in Addendum A.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE. STANDARD OF REVIEW, PRESERVATION
Issue. Whether the trial court committed reversible error in refusing to instruct the
jury on the lesser offense of attempted possession of a controlled substance which was
requested by the defendant in support of his defense?
Standard of Review. The trial judge's refusal to give a lesser offense jury
instruction requested by the defense involves a legal question which is reviewed for
correctness. State v. Simpson. 904 P.2d 709, 711 (Utah App. 1995).

Preservation. This issue was preserved at R. 147:91, 160-69, a copy of which is in
Addendum B.

TEXT OF RELEVANT STATUTES
The text of the following statute is in Addendum C:
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (Supp. 2000).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On June 20, 2000, the state charged Defendant/Appellant Wintron Nunez
("Appellant" or "Nunez") with one count of "unlawful distribution, offering, agreeing,
consenting or arranging to distribute" a controlled substance in a public park, a second
degree felony. R. 7-8. A jury trial was held on October 24, 2000. R. 147. The jury
convicted Nunez as charged. R. 84. Following sentencing on December 4, 2000, Nunez
filed a timely notice of appeal on December 15, 2000. R. 125.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On June 14, 2000, Salt Lake City Police Officer Tyrone Farillas was working in
thePioneerParkandshelter area of Salt Lake City. R. 147:94-5. Officer Farillas, who
had been a police officer for three years, was working undercover. R. 147:94-5. He
wore a wire and was working with six other officers who were not undercover.
R. 147:96, 112.
During the 3:00 p.m. to 1:00 a.m. shift that the team worked on June 14, 2000,
Officer Farillas and the others made eight to nine arrests. R. 147:96, 110. Farillas was
2

the undercover officer in each of those arrests and wrote reports for each arrest.
R. 147:110. Farillas could not remember whether the incident in this case was the first
undercover buy he attempted to make that evening. R. 147:111. He also was unclear as
to the time at which this occurred, initially testifying that it was around 8:00 p.m., but
later acknowledging that his report showed it was 5:03 p.m. R. 147:103, 112.
After Officer Farillas walked into the northwest corner of Pioneer Park, he was
approached by a black male, Claude Ryans, Jr., who asked undercover officer Farillas
whether Farillas had any "mota." R. 147:97, 103. ,fMota" is a term used to refer to
marijuana. R. 147:97.
Farillas and Ryans were together by themselves for three minutes. R. 147:98.
They then saw another black male, Appellant, walking on 300 south towards the park.
R. 147:98.
The pair made contact with Nunez, and Ryans asked Nunez for some mota.
R. 147:98. Farillas testified that Appellant said, "I don't have any, but I can -1 can -1 can
find it for you." R. 147:99. Farillas then told Nunez that he, too, was looking for mota.
R. 147:99. Nunez said, "follow me." R. 147:99.
The trio walked westbound on 300 South. R. 147:99. Farillas told Nunez that he
wanted $20 worth of marijuana. R. 147:99. Ryans said he was looking for $10 worth of
marijuana. R. 147:100.
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Nunez told the pair he had a friend at the shelter named Steve who could probably
hook Ryans and Farillas up with some marijuana. R. 147:100. Nunez, Farillas and Ryans
walked to the shelter, which the officer testified was within 1000 feet of the park.
R. 147:101. Nunez told Ryans and Farillas to wait while Nunez got his friend, Steve.
R. 147:101. Nunez returned without Steve and told Ryans and Farillas that Steve had run
out of marijuana that morning. R. 147:102.
Nunez told Farillas and Ryans that he knew another guy who might have
marijuana, and told the pair to follow him again. R. 147:102. They walked back toward
the Salvation Army food line where the other person often hung out. R. 147:102. The
other person was not at the food line, however. R. 147:104.
Nunez told Farillas and Ryans to follow him back into the park. R. 147:104. They
walked side by side, three abreast, to the northwest corner of the park, where they saw a
white female. R. 147:104, 121. Ryans was closest to the female and Farillas the farthest
away from her. R. 147:122. According to the officer, Nunez and the female talked for a
maximum of thirty seconds, while the officer and Ryans stayed back about ten feet away.
R. 147:104, 117. Farillas could not hear anything they said. R. 147:105. Nunez then
said, "follow us" and they followed Nunez and the female back to the food line.
R. 147:104.
The female, Rebecca Hellman, motioned Farillas and Ryans to sit by her.
R. 147:104, 151. She said, "How much are you looking for?" R. 04. Farillas said, "20."
4

R. 147:104. Prior to that, Farillas had not talked with the female nor indicated to her that
he wanted to buy marijuana. R. 147:110.
Hellman took two baggies of marijuana from her sock and handed them to Farillas.
R. 147:104. Farillas gave her $20, then got up and walked over to Appellant, who was
standing about four feet away. R. 147:104. Nunez wanted some of the marijuana, and
told Farillas to wait for him. R. 147:104, 109. Farillas observed Ryans give the female a
$10 bill while waiting for the arrest team to arrive. R. 147:106.
Farillas acknowledged that throughout this incident, he, Nunez and Ryans "were
just kind of hanging out together." R. 147:123. The atmosphere was not businesslike.
R. 147:123. When Nunez and Hellman began talking, there was no indication that they
knew each other. R. 147:124.
Farillas stated that it was a "done deal," which told the officers who were listening
over the wire that a transaction had taken place. R. 147:105. The officers arrived and
arrested everyone, including Farillas. R. 147:117. Ms. Hellman slipped out of her
handcuffs and ran. R. 147:119.
Claude Ryans testified that on June 14, he picked up his paycheck then went to
Pioneer Park to look for some marijuana. R. 147:145. He approached a group which
included Nunez and asked whether they knew where he could find some marijuana and
that he would give them a joint if they helped him find some. R. 147:146. Nunez told
Ryans he did not smoke marijuana, then the group went looking for some marijuana.
5

R. 147:146. Ryans did not know Nunez before that day. R. 147:146.
Nunez testified that Officer Farillas approached him and Ryans and asked whether
they knew where to find marijuana. R. 147:150. Nunez responded, "I don't know."
R. 148:150. Nunez also told Farillas that he had a friend named Steve who usually had
marijuana. R. 147:150. Farillas, Ryans and Nunez looked for Steve but could not find
him. R. 147:150. They walked back towards the park and Hellman approached them.
R. 147:151. Nunez testified that he did not talk with Hellman. R. 147:151. Instead, she
asked the three what they were looking for. R. 147:152. Farillas responded that he was
looking for twenty dollars worth of marijuana. R. 147:152. Ryans, Hellman and Farillas
then made their transactions. R. 147:154. Nunez was not involved and was not watching
what happened. R. 147:154.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court committed reversible error in failing to instruct the jury on the
lesser offense of attempted possession of a controlled substance, as requested by the
defendant. When a defendant requests a lesser offense instruction, due process is violated
by the failure to give such an instruction where (1) the charged offense and the requested
lesser offense have overlapping elements, and (2) the evidence viewed in the light most
favorable to the defense demonstrates a rational basis for acquitting the defendant of the
charged offense and convicting him of the lesser offense. In this case where both of these
requirements were met, the trial court violated Appellant's right to due process and
6

committed reversible error in refusing to instruct the jury on attempted possession of a
controlled substance.
ARGUMENT
POINT. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
REFUSING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON ATTEMPTED
POSSESSION OF MARIJUANA, A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE
INSTRUCTION REQUESTED BY THE DEFENSE IN SUPPORT OF ITS
THEORY OF THE CASE.
The defense requested that the trial judge instruct the jury on attempted possession
of marijuana. R. 147:91, 160-66. The trial judge denied the motion, reasoning that the
defense was not entitled to that lesser included instruction because "there are no facts
upon which, in my view, a jury would render that verdict." R. 147:169. In refusing to
instruct the jury on the defense theory of the case, the trial judge committed reversible
error.
Different concerns exist when the defendant requests a lesser included offense
instruction than when the prosecution requests such an instruction. See State v. Carruthu
1999 UT 107, f6, 993 P.2d 869. When the prosecution requests a lesser instruction, all of
the elements of the lesser crime must necessarily be included in the crime charged in
order to give the defendant notice. State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152, 155 (Utah 1983). By
contrast, the concern when the defendant requests a lesser instruction is that the defendant
be given the "full benefit" of the proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard. Carruth,
1999 UT 107, Tf6 (quoting Baker, 671 P.2d at 156.) Accordingly,
7

when the defendant requests a lesser included offense instruction, the
standard is somewhat different. In that situation, there must be some
overlapping of the statutory elements of the offenses. If that overlapping
exists and the evidence is ambiguous and susceptible to alternative
interpretations, the trial court must give a lesser included offense instruction
if any one of the alternative interpretations provides both a "rational basis
for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and convicting
him of the included offense."
State v. Oldrovd. 685 P.2d 551, 553-54 (Utah 1984) (citations omitted).
While a defendant's right to a lesser included offense instruction is not absolute or
unqualified, it nevertheless requires a lesser included offense instruction under less
stringent standards than are required when the prosecution requests a lesser instruction.
See Baker, 671 P.2d at 157-58. Moreover, due process requires that such an instruction
be given when the evidence warrants it. Id at 157 (citations omitted).
Hence, when a defendant requests a lesser included offense instruction, such an
instruction must be given when (1) the offense is included in that at least some of the
statutory elements overlap, and (2) there is a "'rational basis for a verdict acquitting the
defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the included offense.'" Baker,
671 P.2d at 159 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(4) (1953 as amended)). In discussing
the second aspect of this test, the Utah Supreme Court stated:
This standard does not require the court to weigh the credibility of the
evidence, a function reserved for the trier of fact. The court must only
decide whether there is a sufficient quantum of evidence presented to justify
sending the question to the jury, a decision which must be made concerning
all jury instructions in any trial. When the elements of two offenses
overlap . . . if there is a sufficient quantum of evidence to raise a jury
8

question regarding a lesser offense, then the court should instruct the jury
regarding the lesser offense. Similarly, when the evidence is ambiguous
and therefore susceptible to alternative interpretations, and one alternative
would permit acquittal of the greater offense and conviction of the lesser, a
jury question exists and the court must give the lesser included offense
instruction at the request of the defendant This situation will often arise
when the critical question is either the credibility of certain evidence or the
determination of what inferences may legitimately be made on the basis of
the evidence.
Baker, 671 P.2d at 159. In the present case, both aspects of the relevant test w en n.il nil
(he trial court s failure to give Nunez's requested instruction on the lesser offense of
jflt'tnpkii possession il m,u i|u;uiii therefore violated due process.
First, the statutory element', oi'disirihii' ""

i i injti;ii»;i jud possession of

marijuana overlap. The statute under which the state charged Nunez iiKikes 11 unl.iss lul lo
"distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, consent, offer, or arrange to
ihsliibnle a ctmilrolled in counterfeit substance." Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii)
(1998). The Informs*

. ^ included as an element

distributing, offering, agreeing, consenting or arrangim
substance. 7?

n

1

94 Since distribution requires possession of the controlled substance,
rr LV oi distribution of marijuana pursuant to section 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii)

and possession ui * •* * *

unl In «.n;lit»ji >K \ '!• Si 2 Hei overlap. Morever, since

arranging involves anticipation of possession, as does 11 \ \ a (t e 1111 \ \ i n j i n •»s <: si i in i w o
statutes overlap.
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Second, the evidence in this case supports giving a lesser included instruction on
the offense of attempted possession since it provided a basis for acquitting Nunez of
distribution and convicting him solely of attempted possession. In assessing that
evidence, this Court does not weigh the evidence or consider whether there was credible
evidence to support a conviction. Oldroyd, 685 P.2d at 555. Instead, this Court must
consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant. Id.
The defense in this case was that Nunez did not "arrange" a drug deal. Instead,
Nunez, Ryans and Farillas were simply hanging out and "all went on a search together."
R. 147:211.
The evidence supported this defense and provided a basis for acquitting Nunez of
arranging the distribution of marijuana. Officer Farillas and Ryans hooked up in Pioneer
Park and Ryans asked the officer whether he had marijuana. R. 147:97, 103. They then
made contact with Nunez and asked him for marijuana. R. 147:98. Nunez did not have
marijuana but thought he could find Steve, who often had matrijuana. R. 147:99. The trio
then ambled around the Pioneer Park/shelter area, looking for Steve or someone else who
sometimes had marijuana. R. 147:99-100. The trio did not find Steve or the other person.
After wandering around for awhile, the three headed back toward Pioneer Park.
Officer Farillas acknowledged that throughout this encounter, Nunez, Ryans and Farillas
were "just kind of hanging out together" and that the atmosphere was not businesslike.
R. 147:123. After the trio returned to Pioneer Park, they hooked up with Hellman.
10

Nunez testified that he never talked with Iltiliniii

I" I I ' I I Imli.uJ. I

1LIIIII.II}

asked

the three what they were looking for, and Farillas responded that he was looking foi
! vcnly dollars worth of marijuana R 147:152. Farillas and Ryans talked with Hellman
withe

„ x . 4 . Nunez wanted to share

some of the marijuana and told Farillas U»\\ nil af1«;r I1 •; - made lir, iic;jl w ilh I lellman.
R 147:104, 109.
In assessing whether the trial court was required to give the defendant's requested
unit II< "li HI tin .., \ i i k n a imisl be viewed in the light most favorable to the defense.
Oldroyd, 685 P.2d at 5 5 :

: r , v i ^ \. v_i,viv.

v,

merely hung out with the officer and Ryans while the three wande

anez
t

y

tried to locate some marijuana, the jury could have found that Nunez's actions did not rise
if-""'""" "I" <» i,'I - 1 it ranging ' a drug deal. Moreover, Nunez testified that he did not talk
with Hellman and th<

previously know Hellman.

Looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to ilu* dcU'tiM\ ih» |im < 1 w id w\\ <:
determined that although Nunez hung out with the officer looking for someone who
i ;.;.:;

• narijuaiia, he did not arrange the deal with Hellman because he did not speak

to her.
• • The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable (o (hi • defense- lil\o.\ isi pi 1 n HIlnl
a rational basis for convicting Nunez of the lesser charge. Farillas, Ryans and Nunc
wandered around looking for someone with marijuana. When Farillas made his deal,

Nunez immediately told him to wait so that Nunez could share the marijuana.
R. 147:104, 109. Given this evidence, the jury could reasonably have found that Nunez
did not arrange a deal but instead was hanging out with Farillas and Ryans in the hope
that he would get some marijuana. Accordingly, there was a rational basis for convicting
Nunez of the lesser offense of attempted possession of marijuana.,
A trial court's error in failing to give a lesser instruction requested by the defense
requires a new trial. See Oldroyd, 685 P.2d at 556 (reversing conviction and remanding
for new trial where trial judge erred in failing to give defendant's requested instruction).
Reversal is required because the failure to give a defendant's lesser instruction deprives
the defendant of the benefit of the reasonable doubt standard, thereby depriving the
defendant of a fair trial. See id. (citing Baker, 671 P.2d at 157). In this case where the
trial court failed to instruct the jury on the lesser offense of attempted possession of a
controlled substance, as requested by the defendant, Appellant's right to due process was
violated and a new trial is required.
CONCLUSION
Defendant/Appellant Wintron Nunez respectfully requests that this Court reverse
his conviction and remand his case for a new trial.
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

THIRD DISTRICT COURT-SALT LAKE COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.

Case No: 001910707 FS

WINTRON DAVID NUNEZ,
Defendant

Judge:
Date:

ROGER A. LIVINGSTON
December 4, 2000

PRESENT
Clerk:
ginam
Prosecutor: JEFF HALL
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): DEBORAH KREECKMENDEZ
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: April 26, 1961
Video
Tape Count: 11:17
CHARGES
X. DISTRIBUTE/OFFER/ARRANGE TO DIST C/S - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 10/24/2000 Guilty
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of DISTRIBUTE/OFFER/ARRANGE TO
DIST C/S a 2nd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an
indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State
Prison.
The prison term is suspended.

Page 1
\^-\

1

Case No: 001910707
Date:
Dec 04, 2000

SENTENCE JAIL
Based on the defendant's conviction of DISTRIBUTE/OFFER/ARRANGE TO
DIST C/S a 2nd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to a term
of 365 day(s)
Credit is granted for time served.
Credit is granted for 163 day(s) previously served.
SENTENCE JAIL SERVICE NOTE
C/o deft to serve 1 year in jail, cts, concurrent.
released for extradition to California.

Deft may be

ORDER OF PROBATION
The defendant is placed on probation for 3 year(s).
Probation is to be supervised by GOOD BEHAVIOR PROBATION.
Defendant to serve 365 day(s) jail.
Defendant is to pay a fine of 0
PROBATION CONDITIONS
Violate no laws.
Dated this _£j _

day
_ ot(^{LfV)h2sS.
-

2<P0„-.
ROGER pj. LIVI^GSTO:
tri/t Courtuudge
District

Page 2 (last)
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ADDENDUM B

MS. WISSLER:

- "we further do or do not find that

this offense took place in or within 1,000 feet of public
park."
MS. KREECK-MENDEZ:

And, your Honor, I am going to

ask that a lesser included — and we can't decide that till the
evidence is in, but the lesser included attempted possession of
a controlled substance.

And so we'll need a special verdict

form for that, your Honor.
THE COURT:

Attempted possession or attempted

distribution?
MS. KREECK-MENDEZ:
THE COURT:

Attempted possession.

A Class C?

MS. KREECK-MENDEZ:

A Class C misdemeanor.

But it

would be — then there would need to be the special verdict to
enhance it to — for being in the park.
THE COURT:

Okay.

All right.

Let me say this.

Can

you by 4:00 o'clock have a verdict form that you want —
MS. KREECK-MENDEZ:
THE COURT:

Uh-huh. (affirmative)

- and whatever.

I don't think I can

delegate that to Gina to have done because we don't know what
exactly that you're going to do.

So I'm just giving you heads

up.
MS. KREECK-MENDEZ:
THE COURT:

That's fine.

We're not going to do verdict forms.

MS. KREECK-MENDEZ:

Okay.

91

1
2

MS. WISSLER:

form which you asked us to prepare.

3

THE COURT:

4

MS. WISSLER:

5

Oh, great.

Okay.

And I understand that there's no

objection to this form.

6
7

Judge , also I have a special verdict

MS. KREECK--MENDEZ:

There's no objection to that, and

then mine is coming .in.

8

THE COURT:

9

MS. KREECK--MENDEZ:

Okay.
I guess we need to deal with the

10 | issue.
11

THE COURT:

12

and see what she wants to do.

13

if you want, just a ITioment.

14

now, or do you want to wait t ill the verdict form comes over?

15

I think we can talk about it on its way, can 7 t we?

And we' 11 let M s . Wissl er look at that
Okay.

You guys all be seated,

Is it all right to talk about that

16

MS. KREECK -MENDEZ:

17

THE COURT:

Let me — you know -

18

THE CLERK:

Is this on the record?

19

THE COURT:

Sure.

I think we can discuss it.

You'd better put this on the

20 | record, ^cause M s . Kreeck-Mendez may not like what I have to
21

say.

22

MS. KREECK -MENDEZ:

23

THE COURT:

I wouldn't at a 11.

And that is, while it is genera lly true,

24

it seems to m e , that in any distribution case , or off'ering or

25

arrangi]ng case, you have the lesser included of possession.

I

160 |

1

think that is ipso facto true in 99 percent of the fact

2

patterns.

3

evidence that Mr. Nunez possessed marijuana, or indeed that he

4

attempted to possess it.

5

I

It seems to me in this particular case there is no

As I understand the State's evidence — and I take it

6

in the light most favorable to the State at this point — that

7

what they have is evidence that Mr. Nunez facilitated the

8

distribution of marijuana from another party to this undercover

9

officer, but he never either possessed — had in his control or

10

dominion — a substance [unintelligible] marijuana, nor did he

11

ever attempt to.

12

In other words, the facts are different than him

13

taking it from party A and giving to party B.

14

that the State's case is one of facilitation, introduction, and

fL5

here's the — I know where a buyer is and I know where a seller

16

is, and here are you two guys, and they consummated the deal.

17

And I just don't know if there's any evidence upon which the

18

jury could reasonably find that Mr. Nunez either possessed or

19

took a substantial step toward possessing it himself.

20

I just think

So it's not as a theoretical matter that I have any

21

problem with it, and I think that 99 percent of time I would

22

grant the motion to have a lesser included, but I just don't

23

see how it fits the facts of this case, and I'd be curious to

24

hear how you think it does.

25

MS. KREECK-MENDEZ:

Your Honor, I think it fits the
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1

facts clearly because Officer Farillas, by the State's own

2

evidence — let's just work with what the State presented —

3

testified that Mr. Nunez asked to use the marijuana.

4

merely a way for him to get some marijuana, by the State's

5

case —

6

THE COURT: Oh.

7

MS. KREECK-MENDEZ:

- to use.

This was

He was in no benefit.

8

His only benefit is he says, MHey, wait for me.

9

share with you."

I want to

I think you can take it one step further

10

where you have Mr. Ryans saying, he says, "Well, I'll give you

11

a joint or I'll give a beer.

12

I'll share with you."

But I think — I think the jury has the evidence

13

before it, by Officer Farillas's own testimony, that Mr. Nunez

14

was merely trying to help him get the drugs so he could attempt

15

it to possess himself.

16

because the officers arrested them.

17

Mr. Farillas not been a police officer, was that all three of

18

them were going to sit down and use it.

19

He didn't actually get to possess it
But his intent, had

That's what Officer Farillas testified, and I think

20

that is a substantial piece of evidence.

21

evidence, and I think that at least the jury should be able to

22

have the instruction to decide if this wasn't merely just an

23

attempt to possess on his own behalf.

24

THE COURT:

25

MS. KREECK-MENDEZ:

It's the State's

Let me just ask one other question, then.
Uh-huh. (affirmative)
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1

THE COURT:

You know, it seems to me the State could

2

have charged, based upon the — certainly they could have

3

charged, in addition to the offering or arranging, they could

4

have charged a C, attempt to possess, because after one crime

5

was committed and that's a consummated deal, then he, in

6

addition to that, attempts to possess some himself.

7

So I'm not - let me just pare back what I think I

8

heard you say, and that is that in addition to the State

9

claiming that he facilitated the transaction from A to B, once

10

B had the stuff, he tried to get B to share it with him.

I'm

11

not sure.

12

have that be a lesser included of the main crime where there's

13

no facts upon which the jury could reasonably find that in lieu

14

of the main?

Because that's an uncharged crime, do you get to

15

I guess what I'm saying is, is it possible that a

16

jury could disbelieve the first part of the officer's

17

testimony, but then, I guess, believe an aside that's not even

18

charged?

19

MS. KREECK-MENDEZ:

20

knowing — the knowing and intentional.

21

Mr. Nunez intend to do here?

22

facilitate his possession?

23

arguments.

24
^5

Well, I think it goes to
What was — what did

Facilitate a distribution, or

And it kind of goes back to my oral

Mr. Ryans wasn't even charged in this matter.
State had a choice.

They had some choices here.

The

One was they
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1

could have gone with city ordinance that we argued — that I had

2

filed a motion on.

3

clearly, the jury gets to decide. Was he intending to aid in a

4

distribution?

5
6

Here, it goes to his intent.

And I think,

Was he intending to get his own drugs here?

And I think that Officer Farillas's testimony puts in
issue, factually —

7

THE COURT:

Okay.

8

MS. KREECK-MENDEZ: - what his intent was.

9

THE COURT:

Let me ask it one other way, just so I

10

understand your position.

11

subjective intent, in introducing A to B, is so that he gets

12

some of the drugs that B gets?

13

if the jury finds that, that he in fact facilitated, assisted,

14

arranged, the transfer of A to B?

15

he an entrepreneur, but now he wants to share in the proceeds.

16
17
18

And that is, what if it is true his

How does that negate the fact,

The fact that not only was

I'm not sure why — lesser included means he didn't do
the higher; he only did the lower.
MS. KREECK-MENDEZ:

It goes to intent, your Honor.

19

What was his intent here?

20

intent to attempt to possess?

21

enough evidence that the jury needs to decide that.

22

his intent?

23

Was his intent to aid, or was his
And I think that clearly we have
What was

That's the key issue here.

THE COURT:

Okay.

Well, let just paraphrase.

I want

24

to make sure I'm hearing you. What I think I really hear you

25

saying is — with all respect to you.

And I think you might be
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1

confusing, or wanting me to confuse, motive and intent.

2

think I hear you saying is, his real motive of this was to get

3

some pot to smoke himself.

4

What I

And if that's his motive, that's okay, but I'm not

5

sure, because that's his underlying motive, that that negates

6

the intent of "Hi, A, this is B.

7

guys ought to" — you know, he brings them together, the intent

8

meaning that he intentionally — volitionally engages in conduct

9

to facilitate the transfer of drugs.

10

B, this is A.

I think you

The fact that his subjective desire or motivation in

11

all of this is so he gets some marijuana to smoke too, I really

12

think I hear what — what I really think I hear you saying is

13

that this is his motive, but that's different than intent.

14

that's kind of -

15

MS. KREECK-MENDEZ:

See, my opinion is that motive —

16

it doesn't — motive is not the issue here.

17

intent.

18

marijuana.

19
20
21

What is his intent?

THE COURT:

Yeah.

So

So I am saying it's

His intent here is to acquire

Intent really goes to the

voluntariness of the act.
MS. KREECK-MENDEZ:

Well, I think it goes to what

22

he — was he intentionally seeking to aid and abet?

23

intentionally seeking to acquire marijuana.

24

THE COURT:

25

MS. KREECK-MENDEZ:

No.

He was

Okay.
I mean not aid and abet.
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1

THE COURT:

2

MS. KREECK-MENDEZ:

3

I understand your position.
Was he intentionally seeking to

aid?

4

THE COURT:

Well, let's see, first of all, maybe

5

Ms. Wissler's not objecting, and I'm just tilting at windmills.

6

Do you want the lesser included instruction or not?

7

MS. WISSLER:

No, Judge, I don't. And I think -

8

THE COURT:

9

MS. WISSLER:

Tell me why it stays out.
Because I don't there's any factual

10

basis for it.

I think that your Honor has hit the nail right

11

on the head, and you, I don't think have said it as

12

emphatically as I will.

13

where this is a lesser included.

14

"and."

15

that we could have charged an additional offense here.

I don't think this is a situation
This is not an "or," it's an

The fact of the matter is, I think the Court's right,

16

But the fact is that by the time Mr. Nunez had made

17

this expression of his desire to share in this marijuana, the

18

offer, arrange, agree was a completed offense.

19

taken place.

20

come to fruition.

21

change hands, only that he offer or arrange or agree to

22

distribute a controlled substance.

23

It had already

The statute does not require that the transaction
It doesn't require that any drugs or money

That offense occurred long before the transaction.

24

In fact, it had occurred several times before the transaction

25

had ever been completed.

So if it's true that the factual
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1

basis for the Class C misdemeanor is in his expression of his

2

desire "Hey.

3

that," that's a separate offense.

4

Now that I've helped you out, can I have some of

It's not a lesser included.

It's a separate

5

occurrence which has not been — it's a separate criminal

6

offense which has not been charged, and I think it's

7

inappropriate, as a matter of law, to give an instruction in

8

that regard, given the fact that there is a higher — we have

9

the reverse Shondel

10

problem.

I mean it's like charging an assault on a homicide

11

case.

12

assault.

13

necessarily have an attempted possession in most circumstances.

14

When you have a homicide, you necessarily have an
When you have an offer, arrange, agree, you

But I agree with the Court that this situation is

15

different, and it's different for several reasons.

16

all, by the defendant's own testimony, or at least his claim is

17

from the stand today, he never intended to get any marijuana

18

for himself.

19

all he did was take this officer over to this guy named Steve.

20

Steve didn't have any marijuana, and that was it, and that was

21

the end of the story.

22

First of

He claims, and he claimed from the stand, that

But we never had any testimony or any discussion

23

about marijuana changing hands from a seller to Mr. Nunez to

24

the officer; we just had the defendant acting as an

25

intermediary.

So he never actually intended to possess it
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1

himself.

2

other people.

3

He was simply facilitating a transaction between two

So I think the attempted possession is a legal

4

fiction in the truest sense.

5

his own testimony, he never attempted to possess it himself.

6

He attempted to facilitate a transaction, and did facilitate a

7

transaction, between any one of four people and this officer,

8

and kept trying until it actually occurred.

9

It didn't happen.

He never — by

So I think the problem is that this instruction, and

10

the factual basis that the defendant is alleging for the

11

instruction, is simply a non-charged additional offense.

12

think, under the circumstances, it's inappropriate to give that

13

instruction because it hasn't been charged.

14

THE COURT:

15

MS. KREECK-MENDEZ:

16

reverse Shondel,

And I

Anything else, Ms. Kreeck-Mendez?
Just one point.

This isn't a

or you would have got a motion that said —

17

THE COURT: Yeah.

18

MS. KREECK-MENDEZ: - attempted possession of a

19

controlled substance, but the facts are different.

20

are lesser; they're just slightly different.

21

lesser, just doesn't quite reach to that level that it would be

22

a

23

But they

And they're

Shondel.
And then it's a question of fact for the jury to

24

decide what Mr. Nunez said as opposed to what Officer Farillas

25

says, that clearly there are both facts, though, here for the
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jury to decide from.
THE COURT:

Thank you. At this time, I'm going to

deny the motion for the separate special verdict form and the
lesser included.

In no way am I suggesting that

Ms. Kreeck-Mendez cannot, and I'm sure she ably will, argue to
the jury reasonable doubt as to intent.
And you can certainly argue, you know, whatever you
want to regarding the issue that he didn't have, in your view,
the mens rae and the evidence failed to present a reasonable
doubt that there was not an intent to facilitate a transfer of
drugs, but rather an intent to possess it himself.
That's certainly a position that in no way am I
restricting you to argue from the jury that — you're certainly
entitled to argue the State has not met its burden of proof.
But in my view you are not entitled to have a lesser included,
I don't think, of attempted possession because it simply —
there are no facts upon which, in my view, a jury could render
that verdict.
And I guess again it goes to the point that the law
seems to criminalize conduct on the facilitator, who is outside
the loop in the sense of not attempting to possess it himself,
but merely arranging for the transfer between two other
parties, and it seems to me that's a fair characterization of
the State's claim in this case.
I wonder what would be the most efficient in terms
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ADDENDUM C

58-37-8^ Prohibited acts — Penalties.
(1) Prohibited acts A — Penalties:
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to
knowingly and intentionally:
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to
produce, manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit substance;
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree,
consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit
substance;
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to
distribute; or
(iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise where:
(A) the person participates, directs, or engages in conduct
which results in any violation of any provision of Title 58,
Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d that is a felony; and
(B) the violation is a part of a continuing series of two or more
violations of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d on
separate occasions that are undertaken in concert with five or
more persons with respect to whom the person occupies a position
of organizer, supervisor, or any other position of management.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a) with respect to:
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II or a controlled substance analog is guilty of a second degree felony and upon a second or
subsequent conviction is guilty of a first degree felony;
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or marijuana, is
guilty of a third degree felony, and upon a second or subsequent
conviction is guilty of a second degree felony; or
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of
a third degree felony.
(c) Any person who has been convicted of a violation of Subsection
(l)(a)(ii) or (iii) may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate
term as provided by law, but if the trier of fact finds a firearm as defined
in Section 76-10-501 was used, carried, or possessed on his person or in his
immediate possession during the commission or in furtherance of the
offense, the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a
term of one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and the court
may additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term
not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not concurrently.
(d) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a)(iv) is guilty of a
first degree felony punishable by imprisonment for an indeterminate term
of not less than seven years and which may be for life. Imposition or
execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not
eligible for probation.
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful:
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a
controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescription or order, directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of
his professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by this chapter;
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any
building, room, tenement, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place

knowingly and intentionally to permit them to be occupied by persons
unlawfully possessing, using, or distributing controlled substances in
any of those locations; or
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an
altered or forged prescription or written order for a controlled substance.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to:
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a
second degree felony;
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, marijuana, if the
amount is more than 16 ounces, but less than 100 pounds, or a
controlled substance analog, is guilty of a third degree felony; or
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an extracted
resin from any part of the plant, and the amount is more than one
ounce but less than 16 ounces, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(c) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) while inside
the exterior boundaries of property occupied by any correctional facility as
defined in Section 64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of confinement
shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than provided in
Subsection (2Kb).
(d) Upon a second or subsequent conviction of possession of any
controlled substance by a person, that person shall be sentenced to a one
degree greater penalty than provided in this Subsection (2).
(e) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to all other
controlled substances not included in Subsection (2)(b)(i), (ii), or (iii),
including less than one ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B
misdemeanor. Upon a second conviction the person is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent conviction the person is
guilty of a third degree felony.
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(ii) or (2)(a)(iii) is:
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor;
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; and
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree
felony.
(3) Prohibited acts C — Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally:
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a
controlled substance a license number which is fictitious, revoked,
suspended, or issued to another person or, for the purpose of obtaining
a controlled substance, to assume the title of, or represent himself to
be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, apothecary, physician, dentist, veterinarian, or other authorized person;
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or attempt to
procure the administration of, to obtain a prescription for, to prescribe
or dispense to any person known to be attempting to acquire or obtain
possession of, or to procure the administration of any controlled
substance by misrepresentation or failure by the person to disclose his
receiving any controlled substance from another source, fraud, forgery, deception, subterfuge, alteration of a prescription or written order
for a controlled substance, or the use of a false name or address;
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or written order for a
controlled substance, or to utter the same, or to alter any prescription
or written order issued or written under the terras of this chapter; or

(iv) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, or
other thing designed to print, imprint, or reproduce the trademark,
•trade name, or other identifying mark, imprint, or device of another or
any likeness of any of the foregoing upon any drug or container or
labeling so as to render any drug a counterfeit controlled substance,
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3)(a) is guilty of a
third degree felony.
(4) Prohibited acts D — Penalties:
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not
authorized under this chapter who commits any act declared to be
unlawful under this section, Title 58, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, or under Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances
Act, is upon conviction subject to the penalties and classifications under
Subsection (4)(b) if the act is committed:
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the
grounds of any of those schools;
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or postsecondary institution or on the grounds of any of those schools or institutions;
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other
structure or grounds which are, at the time of the act, being used for
an activity sponsored by or through a school or institution under
Subsections (4)(aXi) and (ii);
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility;
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center;
(vi) in a church or synagogue;
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, theater,
movie house, playhouse, or parking lot or structure adjacent thereto;
(viii) in a public parking lot or structure;
(ix) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds included
in Subsections (4)(a)(i) through (viii); or
(x) in the immediate presence of a person younger than 18 years of
age, regardless of where the act occurs.
(b) A person convicted under this Subsection (4) is guilty of a first
degree felony and shall be imprisoned for a term of not less than five years
if the penalty that would otherwise have been established but for this
subsection would have been a first degree felony. Imposition or execution
of the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not eligible for
probation.
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been established
would have been less than a first degree felony but for this Subsection (4),
a person convicted under this Subsection (4) is guilty of one degree more
than the maximum penalty prescribed for that offense.
(d) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this Subsection (4) that the
actor mistakenly believed the individual to be 18 years of age or older at
the time of the offense or was unaware of the individual's true age; nor
that the actor mistakenly believed that the location where the act occurred
was not as described in Subsection (4)(a) or was unaware that the location
where the act occurred was as described in Subsection (4)(a).
(5) Any violation ofthis chapter for which no penalty is specified is a class
B misdemeanor.
(6) (a) Any penalty imposed for violation ofthis section is in addition to, and
not in lieu of, any civil or administrative penalty or sanction authorized by
law.

(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal law or the law of
another state, conviction or acquittal under federal law or the law of
another state for the same act is a bar to prosecution in this state.
(7) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof which
shows a person or persons produced, manufactured, possessed, distributed, or
dispensed a controlled substance or substances, is prima fade evidence that
the person or persons did so with knowledge of the character of the substance
or substances.
(8) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good faith and in the
course of his professional practice only and not for humans, from prescribing,
dispensing, or administering controlled substances or from causing the substances to be administered by an assistant or orderly under Ms direction and
supervision.
(9) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on:
(a) any person registered under the Controlled Substances Act who
manufactures, distributes, or possesses an imitation controlled substance
for use as a placebo or investigational new drug by a registered practitioner in the ordinary course of professional practice or research; or
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and legitimate
scope of his employment.
(10) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of any provision to
any person or circumstances, is held invahd, the remainder of this chapter
shall be given effect without the invahd provision or application.

